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Studies addressing the question “Can a learner complete the learning securely?” have recently
been spurred from the standpoints of fundamental theory and potential applications. In the relevant
context of this question, we present a classical-quantum hybrid sampling protocol and define a secu-
rity condition that allows only legitimate learners to prepare a finite set of samples that guarantees
the success of the learning; the security condition excludes intruders. We do this by combining our
security concept with the bound of the so-called probably approximately correct (PAC) learning,
and therefore, we call the condition quantum secure PAC learning condition. We show that while
the lower bound on the learning samples guarantees PAC learning, an upper bound can be derived
to rule out adversarial learners. Such a secure learning condition is appealing, because it is defined
only by the size of samples required for the successful learning and is independent of the algorithm
employed. Notably, the security stems from the fundamental quantum no-broadcasting principle.
No such condition can thus occur in any classical regime, where learning samples can be copied.
Owing to the hybrid architecture, our scheme also offers a practical advantage for implementation
in noisy intermediate-scale quantum (NISQ) devices.
Introduction.—The hybridization of machine learning
and quantum theory has been intensively studied, espe-
cially to explore the possibility of exploiting quantum
learning speedups. Very recently, the incorporation of
useful quantum-algorithm-kernel (e.g., quantum linear
solvers [1]) into data processing tasks in machine learning
has yielded encouraging results [2–5]. Within a span of a
few years, such approaches have become increasingly im-
portant in quantum computation, leading to the advent
of quantum machine learning [6, 7].
In parallel, the issue of security has been of consider-
able interest to the machine learning community. The
term “secure learning” is usually used to indicate that
the learning is allowed only for the legitimate learner,
who wants to rule out adversarial learners. The main
objective of these adversaries is to acquire ability to be-
come equals of the legitimate learner or to render the
learning of the legitimate learner counterproductive. In
this context, one of the open issues is how to define a
secure learning condition for detecting and preventing
these adversaries. While this problem has been widely
studied in classical learning [8, 9], only a few quantum
mechanical studies have been conducted so far [10–12].
In this Letter, we provide a notion of a secure learning
condition with favorable quantum properties [33]. To this
end, we first design a protocol for secure sampling that
runs between two legitimate learning parties. We cast
a classical-quantum hybrid oracle that allows large-size
classical inputs with small-scale quantum system [13]. As
the main result, we derive a secure learning condition
such that only the original legitimate learner is guaran-
teed success for learning; we designate the condition as
“secure probably-approximately-correct (PAC) learning”
condition. The beauty of this condition is that the secu-
rity is derived only from the size of learning samples the
legitimate learner requires and it stems from the quan-
tum no-broadcasting principle [14, 15]. Therefore, such
condition cannot be defined in any classical regime. Our
study also leads to an intriguing classical-quantum in-
terplay, namely, in which the (large) input data remains
classical while the useful quantum properties are explored
for a small quantum system [16, 17]. Such architecture
helps avoid the use of a largely superposed sample and is
well suited to NISQ technologies [18].
Problem.—Given a (Boolean) function c ∈ C that
maps the input x = x0x1 · · ·xn−1 to a binary value
c(x) ∈ {0, 1}, learning is defined as the process of iden-
tifying a hypothesis h ∈ H close to c. The binary num-
ber xj ∈ {0, 1} (j = 0, 1, . . . , n − 1) can be considered
as the “feature” and the size of the hypothesis set |H|,
called “model complexity,” is assumed to be finite. Such
a problem covers a wide variety of learning tasks. In par-
ticular, this binary setting of the problem can, in prin-
ciple, be extended to a more general situation such as
multi-class tasks [19]. For this reason, the binary classi-
fication framework has generally been used in computa-
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FIG. 1: Schematic of our sampling protocol. Alice (A ) has
facilities for the preparation of inputs, (x, |α〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}) or
(r, |α〉 ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉}). A can also perform a single-qubit mea-
surement to identify the returning qubit. Bob (B) owns the
oracle. Here, we consider a classical-quantum hybrid archi-
tecture (blue dashed and solid boxes) with a classical input (x
or r) and an ancillary qubit state (|α〉). The oracle does not
reveal its structure. A and B communicate via classical and
quantum channels, denoted by CAB and QAB, respectively.
tional learning theory [20, 21].
In such a problem, the learner, say Alice (A ), should
first sample a set T of input-target pairs, where T =
{(x, c(x))}. To accomplish this sampling, A employs a
black-box, called oracle. The oracle is responsible for ac-
cessing critical information, namely, c(x) for a given x.
Here, we assume that the oracle is owned by A ’s distant
partner, say Bob (B). Such an assumption, namely, of
the two learning parties being located far apart, is com-
monly invoked in secure learning [8]. The issue is then
how A can sample a clean dataset T with B in a man-
ner that is secure against any malicious attack; in other
words, how A can learn c securely?
Secure sampling protocol.—We introduce a classical-
quantum hybrid oracle O(c), which consists of in-
put/output channels for n-bit classical data x and for
a single-qubit, denoted by CAB and QAB, respectively.
This oracle O(c) implements (x, |α〉) → (x, |c(x)〉) for
α ∈ {0, 1} and (r, |α〉) → (r, |α〉) for α ∈ {+,−}, where
|c(x)〉 is the oracle-answer for a given x. Here, r is an
insignificant random input chosen such that (r, y) /∈ T
(for any y ∈ {0, 1}) [34]. Note that it is not permissible
to extract any information by looking into O(c).
We now present the secure sampling protocol, which
proceeds as follows. First, A prepares the state |α〉 as
an eigenstate of σˆz or σˆx (i.e., |α〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉 , |±〉 =
1√
2
(|0〉 ± |1〉)}) at random. The prepared state |α〉 is
transferred to B through QAB. If |α〉 = |0〉 or |1〉, A
sends the input x through CAB together with |α〉, and
if |α〉 = |±〉, A draws a random input r. Subsequently,
(x, |α〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉}) or (r, |α〉 ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉}) are passed
through the oracle O(c), and the output states |c(x)〉 or
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FIG. 2: General attack by adversarial learners. Here, we con-
sider L − 1 adversarial learners who can freely access CAB
and QAB. Each adversarial learner has his/her own (in prin-
ciple, infinite size) ancillary system and is assumed to be as
expert in quantum theory. We further assume that the ad-
versarial learners can team up to process an optimal strategy
E for their own or for the group’s benefit.
|±〉 of the qubit are returned to A . For |α〉 ∈ {|0〉 , |1〉},
A obtains a sample pair (x, c(x)) by performing σˆz-
measurement, and for |α〉 ∈ {|+〉 , |−〉}, A should receive
|α〉 = |±〉 from B. Therefore, by checking the returned
state |±〉 with the σˆx-measurement, A can sense any
adversarial learner, often referred to as Eve (E ), who
alters the qubits by moving A → B or B → A (see
Fig. 1). Note that (r, y) /∈ T for any y ∈ {0, 1} obtained
by σˆz-measurement, and it cannot be a valid sample.
No-broadcasting of learning samples.—With this pro-
tocol, we present our first result:
Theorem 1. In our protocol, for any given c ∈ C, B
cannot distribute the full set of learning samples, namely,
T = {(x, c(x))}, to A or other (external) learners.
Therefore, the condition
T = T (k) (∀k ∈ [1, L]), (1)
where T (k) is the set of samples that the k-learner (i.e.,
A or E ) finally gets for strategy E, cannot be satisfied.
For proving this theorem, we let ρˆ0 = |c(x)〉 〈c(x)| and
ρˆ1 = |α〉 〈α|, each of which is defined in terms of a state of
the ideal oracle output in a trial for a given input (x or r).
Here, ρˆ0 ∈ {|0〉 〈0| , |1〉 〈1|} and ρˆ1 ∈ {|+〉 〈+| , |−〉 〈−|}.
Suppose B adopts a strategy E to distribute the samples
in T among learners (including A ), with L ≥ 2. In
general, E can be represented as a completely positive
and trace-preserving map such that ρˆs⊗Γˆ E−→ ρˆ(1)E,s⊗ρˆ(2)E,s⊗
. . .⊗ ρˆ(L)E,s (s = 0, 1), where Γˆ represents a state of L− 1
qubits, each of which is distributed to the corresponding
learner, except A (here, k = 1 denotes A ). We can write
ρˆ
(k)
E,s = TrS\(k)UˆE
(
ρˆs ⊗ Γˆ⊗ Ξˆ
)
Uˆ†E , where TrS\(k) denotes
the partial trace with respect to all systems S except
the one labeled with the k-th learner, Ξˆ is an arbitrary
ancilla state, and UˆE is an overall unitary. This situation
is depicted in Fig. 2. Then, it is true that B cannot
3broadcast the states ρˆs (s = 0, 1) to a (k-indexed) learner.
This is confirmed by the principle that the states ρˆ0 and
ρˆ1 are not distinguishable [14, 22]. Therefore, a sample
pair (x, c(x)) cannot be shared for a given x. Thus, the
full set of T cannot be distributed in the complete form
and Theorem 1 holds.
Secure PAC learning.—Suppose that A is the only le-
gitimate learner, and the other L − 1 learners are ma-
licious intruders. Without loss of generality, we let
k ∈ {A ,E } with L = 2, or equivalently, by assuming
that all L−1 intruders team up together as one E . In this
setting, we can assume that E is a general attack strategy
adopted by E . Then, Theorem 1 describes the following
situation: if E disturbs the protocol, the samples pre-
pared by A (and also E ) must be noisy; specifically, a
portion ηA (and ηE ) of the contaminated samples, for
example, (x, c(x) ⊕ 1), would be included in A ’s (and
E ’s) samples. Note that A and E cannot identify these
contaminations. Here, η(k) ≤ 12 (k ∈ {A ,E }) and is
determined by E ’s strategy E . It can be expressed as
η(k) = 1−
∣∣∣T (k)S ∣∣∣∣∣T (k)∣∣ , (2)
where T
(k)
S denotes the set of uncontaminated samples in
T (k); namely, T
(k)
S ⊆ T (k) and T (k)S ⊆ T . We indicate
that Theorem 1 forbids any strategy E that allows the
condition (
ηc ≥ ηA
) ∧ (ηc ≥ ηE ) , (3)
where
ηc = 1− 1N
∑
Trials
F (ρˆs, ρˆ
E
E,s). (4)
Here,
∑
Trials denotes the summation over the trials, and
F (ρˆ, σˆ) is the fidelity between the states ρˆ and σˆ [23].
This condition is true because E has to sort out his/her
own valid samples by identifying ρˆ0 and ρˆ1. If it is
noted that the states ρˆs are cloneable iff they are distin-
guishable (given a product space of A and E ) [22, 24],
F (ρˆs, ρˆ
E
E,s) can be understood as the optimal fidelity
achievable by a (1 → 2) ρˆs-cloner in each trial. An ex-
ample is ηc =
1
6 in the qubit case [15].
We now discuss secure learning in the framework of the
so-called PAC learning [21, 25]. In a PAC learning, the
concept class C is said to be (, δ)-PAC learnable (we call
the learner (, δ)-PAC learner) if an -approximated cor-
rect solution (i.e., hypothesis) h ∈ H can be found with
a probability 1− δ; in other words, C is said to be (, δ)-
PAC learnable if P [E(h, c) ≤ ] ≥ 1−δ is satisfied for any
c ∈ C, where E(h, c) is an error function that indicates
how h and c differ [21]. Such a theorem of PAC learning
indicates that if a learner is allowed to use a certain size,
say Mb(, δ), of contaminated samples with η, he/she
is guaranteed to be a (, δ)-PAC learner [35]. Usually,
Mb(, δ) is referred to as “sample complexity” [20, 26].
Here, Mb(, δ) is divided into two categories depending
on whether the samples are ideal (i.e., η = 0) or noisy
(i.e., η ∈ (0, 12 ]) [36]. The latter, namely, the noisy PAC
learning model, provides a useful framework and is suit-
able for our study because contaminations, either from
E or from imperfection intrinsic to the channels, can be
included in the expression for η(k).
It is noteworthy that the (full) quantum model of the
PAC learning, namely, quantum PAC learning, was also
developed by using a quantum oracle that allows the
(large) superposition of the inputs x; the superposition
helps reduce the quantum-sample complexity [27]. How-
ever, no study has been conducted on secure learning in
a classical or a quantum PAC learning framework.
We now present our second result:
Theorem 2. For any given c ∈ C, let MAb (, δ) and
MEb (, δ) denote the “optimal” sample complexities of A
and E , respectively [37]. Then, during the running of our
protocol, if A becomes a (, δ)-PAC learner by identifying
the samples smaller than MEb (, δ), E cannot become a
(, δ)-PAC learner for the same  and δ.
The proof of this theorem is as follows. First, con-
sider the case ηA ≥ ηE , which will lead to MAb (, δ) ≥
MEb (, δ). In this case, it is impossible forA to be a (, δ)-
PAC learner with M samples smaller than MEb (, δ). Sec-
ond, in the case of ηA < ηE , if A completes the learning
with M samples and becomes a (, δ)-PAC learner satis-
fying MEb (, δ) > M ≥ MAb (, δ), then E cannot simul-
taneously be a (, δ)-PAC learner because the protocol
will be terminated before E obtains a sufficient number
of samples (i.e., larger than MEb (, δ)) to be a (, δ)-PAC
learner. This proves Theorem 2.
On the basis of the above analysis, we present a defi-
nition for a secure learner:
Definition 1. For any c ∈ C, suppose A identifies h
with M samples, with
Mc(, δ) ≥M ≥Mb(, δ). (5)
Here, Mb(, δ) and Mc(, δ) are defined as M
(k)
b (, δ)
when η(k) → 0 and η(k) → ηc, respectively, where k is
either A or E . Then, we call A a quantum secure (, δ)-
PAC learner.
In this definition, the lower bound of the sample size
(i.e., M ≥Mb(, δ)) is necessary for A to be a (, δ)-PAC
learner. The upper bound (i.e., Mc(, δ) ≥M) is adopted
for security, and it follows from Theorem 2 and Eq. (3).
For wide applicability of Theorem 1, 2 and Definition 1,
we apply two additional rules: [R.1] When the number
of trials for (r, |α〉) reaches Mb(, δ)− Γ, then A tests
whether
Mc(r)6=α
Mb(,δ)−Γ is larger than ηc −∆, where Mc(r)6=α
4is the number of inconsistent results (i.e., c(r) 6= α) in
A ’s σˆx-measurement. If
Mc(r)6=α
Mb(,δ)−Γ ≥ ηc−∆, A suspends
the process by confirming that the state change, namely,
|±〉 → |∓〉, occurs by E ; otherwise, A continues the
process [38]. [R.2] If the learning is not completed until
the number of trials for (x, |α〉) reaches Mc(, δ), A quits
the process. It is to be noted that the factors Γ and ∆ in
[R.1] are introduced to limit the quality of E ’s learning.
We can now analyze the possible situations. First, let
us consider the case (i) ηA ≥ ηE . Then, the following
two subcases can be considered:
(i-a) ηA ≥ ηc −∆ ≥ ηE and (i-b) ηA ≥ ηE ≥ ηc −∆.
However, cases (i-a) and (i-b) do not actually happen
because [R.1] will halt the process when ηA ≥ ηc − ∆;
hence E is not allowed to become a (, δ)-PAC learner.
Second, for the case (ii) ηA < ηE , we can also consider
the following two subcases:
(ii-a) ηE > ηc −∆ ≥ ηA and (ii-b) ηE > ηA ≥ ηc −∆.
In case (ii-a), if A can learn h ' c (for any given  and δ)
with M samples, with M satisfying Eq. (5), A becomes a
secure (, δ)-PAC learner according to Definition 1, while
E cannot. However, at least in theory, it is not impossible
for E to obtain the samples with a size identical to A ’s
after the completion of A ’s learning. Nevertheless, E
cannot be a (, δ)-PAC learner at the same level as A
since ηE cannot be smaller than ηA + ∆. The condition
ηA ≥ ηc−∆ in (ii-b) will also halt the protocol because of
rule [R.1]. Thus, our results (i.e., Theorem 1 and 2 and
Definition 1) can be practically applied to the protocol
against any E . Further, by using Γ and ∆, we can set
the minimum gap between the level of A ’s and E ’s PAC
learning in the worst case, and it would prevent E from
becoming a slightly weaker PAC learner than A . The
subcases ηc −∆ ≥ ηA ≥ ηE and ηc −∆ ≥ ηE > ηA are
not expected to occur since they contradict Eq. (3).
Multi-class classification.—We also consider the multi-
class problem by assuming that the inputs x belongs to
2m different classes (m ≥ 2). (i) First, the multi-class
classification problem is commonly solved by decompos-
ing it into several binary problems. For instance, the
“one-vs-all (OVA)” reduction is often used [19], where
the problem is decomposed into 2m decisions of hi (i ∈
{0, 1, . . . , 2m−1}) that separates the learning data of the
i-th class from the other ones. Then, data x is classified
with arg maxi hi(x). Here, the condition for secure PAC
learning in Eq. (5) can be applied to each decision of
hi. However, a long learning time is required because
the condition in Eq. (5) should be satisfied for every 2m
decisions. (ii) In another way, we can consider a single-
machine approach, where the oracle can answer for all 2m
labels, that is, y ∈ {0, 1}m, by allowing m qubits condi-
tioned by the same x-input channels. In such generaliza-
tion, our theorems and the condition in Eq. (5) can also
be applied consistently for the states of an arbitrary num-
ber of qubits. However, in this case, the region that sat-
isfies the secure PAC learning, i.e., |Mc(, δ)−Mb(, δ)|,
narrows. In other words, the security condition becomes
more stringent [39].
Remarks.—We have presented a concept of secure
learning that safeguards against any malicious manip-
ulation of learning samples. In contrast to other studies
on secure learning, we constructed an analytic framework
based on a computational model of learning theory, called
PAC learning. This allowed us to establish the link be-
tween sample complexity and the condition for learning
security. Our approach is appealing because the security
condition is defined solely by the sample size; in particu-
lar, it is independent of A ’s (or E ’s) learning algorithms.
Our derivations of Theorem 1 and 2 were based on the
quantum principle of no-broadcasting of states, and using
these theorems, we introduced the concept of secure PAC
learning. Such a security condition cannot exist in the
classical regime where E can create as many copies of the
learning samples as he/she wishes.
It is noteworthy that our protocol was designed based
on a classical-quantum hybridization, where the input
data remain classical but only a single-qubit system is
employed. Such a hybridization differs considerably from
those of other hybrid models. This architecture renders
our protocol suitable for NISQ implementation, without
the requirement of an excessively large superposition of
samples and/or without accessing a novel quantum gad-
get, called quantum random-access memory [28, 29].
We finally point out that determining a more practical
form of Mc(, δ) in Eq. (5) continues to be an open prob-
lem, and it would be considered in a follow-up study.
Notably, it is related to the determination of the opti-
mal sample complexity, which has been a long-standing
interest in computational learning theory, especially in
the case where the samples are noisy. We believe that
our study will contribute to expanding the frontiers for
quantum secure machine learning.
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FIG. S3: Schematic of a hybrid oracle. The oracle consists of two different input/output channels: classical input data
x = x1x2 · · ·xn (xj ∈ {0, 1} ∀j = 1, . . . , n) and a single-qubit to produce the oracle output states. This oracle applies 2n
unitary gates aˆk ∈ {σˆz, iσˆy} (k = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1) conditioned on the values of the classical bits xj in x to the qubit channel.
In a purely classical case, these gates are either identity or logical-not gates.
USEFUL CLASSICAL-QUANTUM HYBRID ORACLE ARCHITECTURE
Here, we present an example of a classical-quantum hybrid oracle, which can be applied to our study on secure
learning. This oracle allows the classical inputs x and a single qubit |α〉. It performs the mapping
(x, |α〉)→ (x, |c(x)〉) for α ∈ {0, 1}, and (r, |α〉)→ (r, |α〉) for α ∈ {+,−}, (S6)
where r is random data that is to be used for performing a security check. Note that x remains unaltered during and
after the sampling process.
This hybrid oracle can be implemented by a circuit having a specific architecture, such as that shown in Fig. S3. This
circuit contains 2n gates acting on the ancilla qubit: the single-qubit gate aˆ0 and 2
n−1 gates aˆk (k = 1, 2, . . . , 2n−1)
conditioned on the classical-bit values x1, x2, . . . , xn in x. The gates aˆk are given by
aˆk ∈ {σˆz, iσˆy} , for all k = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1, (S7)
where σˆx, σˆy, and σˆz are the Pauli operators. This architecture of the oracle is inspired by the general expression of
a Boolean function [1], which is given by
h?(x) = a0 ⊕ a1x1 ⊕ a2x2 ⊕ a3x1x2 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a2n−1x1x2 . . . xn, (S8)
where ak ∈ {0, 1} (k = 0, 1, . . . , 2n − 1) are known as the Reed–Muller coefficients. Here, each coefficient has a
corresponding gate operation aˆk. More specifically, ak = 0 implies that aˆk leaves the bit signal unchanged (identity),
while ak = 1 indicates that aˆk flips the bit signal (logical-not) [2]. The oracle is thus characterized by a fixed set of
gates aˆk for a given c. Information of the gates aˆk and how they run is not provided, and it should be learned. Such
an oracle architecture indeed differs from other hybrid schemes. It has been argued that such hybridization can offer
an advantages of being NISQ-implementable and of achieving speedups [3, 4].
PROBABLY-APPROXIMATELY-CORRECT (PAC) LEARNING MODEL
In the probably-approximately-correct (PAC) learning model [5], a learner samples a finite set of training data
{(xi, c(xi))} (i = 1, 2, . . . ,M) by accessing an oracle. Here, xi is typically assumed to be drawn uniformly. For any
7c ∈ C, a learning algorithm is a (, δ)-PAC learner (under uniform distribution) if it can obtains an -approximated
correct h ∈ H with probability 1− δ. More specifically, a learning algorithm is a (, δ)-PAC learner if it satisfies the
condition
Prob(E(h, c) ≤ ) ≥ 1− δ, (S9)
where E(h, c) denotes the error, for example, the distance between h and c. If the obtained h agrees with
M ≥ 1

ln
|H|
δ
(S10)
of samples constructed from the oracle, then Eq. (S9) holds. Here, |H| denotes the cardinality of H, often-called model
complexity. In the standard context, Eq. (S10) is known as the “sample complexity” [5, 6]. In other words, it yields
the minimum number of training samples required to successfully learn h ∈ H, satisfying Eq. (S9). Such a sample
complexity derived from previous classical studies can be directly used in our scenario. In our classical-quantum
hybrid query scheme, the same sample complexity exists since xi and c(xi) identified by the measurement performed
by Alice are classical. The beauty of this theorem is that the condition for being PAC learner depends only on the
number of samples, not on any specific learning algorithm.
In the case where the oracle outputs are contaminated, the sample complexity in Eq. (S10) is modified as follows:
First, we draw a sequence of training data,
{(x1,m1), (x2,m2), . . . , (xM ,mM )}, (S11)
where mi ∈ {c(xi), c(xi)⊕1} denotes the outcome of the measurement performed by Alice. Subsequently, if sampling
is performed with
M ≥ 2ξ
2
ln
(
2 |H|
δ
)
, (S12)
we can verify that Eq. (S9) holds for the algorithm that obtains h ∈ H. It has been proven that the additional factor
ξ is given by [7]
ξ =
1
(1− 2η)2 . (S13)
Such a noisy PAC learning model provides a useful framework for our study of secure learning. It is noteworthy that
in our scenario, the contamination of the output because of an attack by Eve and that resulting from imperfections
intrinsic to the oracle can be incorporated together into the factor η.
EXTENSION TO MULTI-CLASS CLASSIFICATION
Each training data can be considered to belong to one of 2m different classes (m ≥ 2), and the goal is to learn
a hypothesis that, given a (new) data point, can correctly decide the class to which the data point belongs. This
problem is called multi-class classification problem.
One-vs-All (OVA) reduction
The conventional approach used to solve the multi-class classification problem is to decompose the problem into
several binary classification problems. The most simple, but powerful, method is the so-called “one-vs-all (OVA)”
reduction [8], where each binary classifier (e.g., RLSC, SVM) is trained to distinguish the examples in a single class
from those in all remaining classes. More specifically, in such strategy, the problem is decomposed to 2m decisions
of hi, (i ∈ {0, 1, . . . , 2m − 1}) that separates the training data of the i-th class from those of the other classes (see
Fig. S4), and (new) data are classified using
h(x) = arg max
i
hi(x), (S14)
where hi(x) is a hypothesis identified in each trial and h(x) is a decision for the classification of the input x. Here,
hi(x) is interpreted as the probability of a given input being included in the i-th class, which is very suitable for our
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FIG. S5: Schematic of the oracle for a N-class output.
PAC learning framework. To achieve OVA reduction, we can apply the condition for secure PAC learning (Eq. (7) of
our main manuscript), as it is, to each trial performed for identifying hi(x). However, in this case, the learning time
is increased as we should prepare the dataset to train 2m classifiers and the secure PAC learning condition should be
satisfied for every 2m trials.
A strategy of single-machine approach
Another useful approach is to solve a single optimization problem that trains many binary classifiers simultaneously;
this approach is akin to the so-called “single machine approach” [8]. To apply this approach, we should consider an
oracle that, given an input x ∈ {0, 1}n, outputs the corresponding label y ∈ {0, 1}m for all 2m classes, for example, by
employing an arbitrary function h : {0, 1}n → {0, 1}m. This is possible by allowing m qubits conditioned by the same
x-input channels (see Fig. S5). More specifically, in this generalization, the oracle performs the following mapping
(x, α1α2 · · ·αm)→ (x, c1(x)c2(x) · · · cm(x)) (S15)
for the learning (i.e., for α0α1 · · ·αm−1 ∈ {0, 1}) and the mapping
(r, α1α2 · · ·αm)→ (r, α1α2 · · ·αm) (S16)
for the security check (i.e., for α0α1 · · ·αm−1 ∈ {+,−}). The learner (Alice, here) can identify the oracle’s output by
measuring each returning qubit and construct the training samples for the learning. In this strategy, our theorems
9and the secure PAC learning condition can be applied to the states of an arbitrary number of qubits. Note that in our
analysis, the states ρˆs and ρˆ
(k)
E comprise an arbitrary number of qubits. The rules [R.1] and [R.2] derived for practical
use of our protocol are applicable to each qubit measurement outcome. However, in this case, Mb(, δ) is expected to
increase as a higher model complexity, |H|, would be imposed for large m. Furthermore, Mc(, δ) decreases since ηc
increases for large m; specifically, we have [9]
ηc = 1−maxF (ρˆ0(x)⊗m, ρˆ⊗mE ) =
1
(2m+ 4)
. (S17)
Consequently, the region |Mc(, δ)−Mb(, δ)| that satisfies the secure PAC learning narrows as m increases; in other
words, the security condition becomes more stringent. Therefore, there exists a trade-off between the two aforemen-
tioned approaches. Note that |Mc(, δ)−Mb(, δ)| ≥ 0 is always satisfied along with the no-broadcasting theorem
with the condition
(
ηc ≥ ηA
) ∧ (ηc ≥ ηE ) in Eq. (4) of our main manuscript.
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